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PATIENTS' RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO THEIR OWN
MEDICAL RECORDS: THE NEED FOR NEW LAW
BARBARA. L. KAISER*

M

edical care delivery systems have come a long way since the time
when most sick people relied upon the general practitioner who
made rounds of the countryside or the neighborhood and came to the
home of the invalid in response to a call. In that time, at least according to the prevailing mythology, the relationship between the patient
and the doctor was a highly personal one, based upon the doctor's
knowledge of the patient's intimate affairs. The doctor was in a special
position to act as confidant and to become privy to the patient's secrets, including, of course, many matters unrelated to the illness he
was called upon to treat. From time immemorial, as we know from
the Hippocratic oath, this knowledge of the dark places of a patient's
private life has been regarded as sacred.'
The general practitioner has in large measure been replaced by
the "primary physician," the "family practitioner" or the outpatient
department of the local hospital. The house call is all but a thing of
the past. It disappeared some time around the Second World War,
with the result that doctors no longer have first-hand knowledge of
their patients' personal and family affairs. Nevertheless, the ethical
obligation of doctors not to disclose what they may learn of their patients' intimate affairs still persists. Care of the sick in any setting
necessarily puts doctors in a position to learn what patients would not
disclose to others, and, psychologically, patients still tend to rely upon
the doctor and his auxiliary personnel. The ethical obligation naturally extends to the records that are made in connection with the patient's medical care, whether by the doctor in his office or by members
of medical care teams functioning in hospitals.
*-Member, New York Bar. B.A., Wellesley College, 1937; L.L.B., Columbia University, 1940.

1. "Whatsoever things I see or hear concerning the life of men, in my attendance

on the sick or even apart therefrom, which ought not to be noised abroad, I will keep
silence thereon, counting such things to be sacred secrets." 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNaA 95 (1968). The oath dates from approximately the fifth century B.C., and is
contained in a collection of the works of Hippocrates known as the Hippocratic Collection brought together not long after 300 B.C. 11 id. at 519.
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In legal terms, the ethical obligation of the doctor, or other providers of health care, can be considered an aspect of the patient's right
to privacy. The protections the law gives to this right are, however,
somewhat indefinite and can scarcely be termed ample. In New York,
for example, there is a statutory tort action for violation of privacy
generally, but because it applies only to the unauthorized commercial
exploitation of someone's name or picture, 2 such an action cannot
give satisfactory protection to the privacy of a patient's medical records. Also, there is a statutory privilege attaching to information obtained by a doctor about a patient in the course of administering
4
medical care.3 The privilege belongs to the patient, and permits him
to exclude from evidence in a litigation the records of his medical
care, provided that the information falls within the statutory definition and provided that the privilege has not been waived. Like other
such privileges created in deference to special confidential relationships, this one is much qualified with exceptions which represent efforts to accommodate the privacy rights of patients to other social
needs of equal importance.6
2. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAv §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1948); see Flores v. Mosler
Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 164 N.E.2d 853, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1959). Constitutional
rights of privacy are a different sort of question, and normally would not play a role
in private relationships.
3. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 4504(a) (McKinney 1963).
4. Unfortunately, the English language third person singular pronouns equate
sex and gender. To avoid excessive awkwardness of style, the masculine pronoun has
sometimes been used in its common-gender, or statutory sense, with full awareness
that the subject of a medical record is as often a woman as a man, and that in fact
the privacy problem may be even more acute for a woman.
5. See, e.g., Mayer v. Albany Medical Center Hosp., 56 Misc. 2d 239, 288
N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
6. In Waters v. Moore, 70 Misc. 2d 372, 377, 334 N.Y.S.2d 428, 434 (Sup. Ct.
1972), the court said of the privacy statute that it "strikes a delicate balance between
the free dissemination of ideas and individual privacy," with the presumption generally
in favor of the former. Some exceptions to the privilege occur: where the information was not required for the treatment of the patient, Mayer v. Albany Medical
Center Hosp., 56 Misc. 2d 239, 288 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1968); in the interests
of justice, when an intent to keep the information confidential has not been shown,
Jansons v. Jansons, 45 Misc. 2d 795, 257 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Milano v.
State, 44 Misc. 2d 290, 253 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Ct. Cl. 1964); and, significantly, when
the physician has examined the patient for purposes other than treatment, Milano V.
State, supra. Under a 1972 act, the privilege is abolished as to certain practitioners,
and is replaced by a provision directing courts to protect medical records against
publicity unless making the records public is necessary to protect the rights of a party.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 3371 (McKinney Supp. 1974). Violation of a specific statutory direction limiting the power of an official to grant access to medical records,
such as exists in N.Y. MENTAL HYGiENE LAW § 15.13 (McKinney Supp. 1974), may
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Most people live out their lives without ever becoming involved
in a law suit, much less one to which their medical records would be
relevant in any way. Nevertheless, the mass of such records that accumulates around us is so great, and the social and economic relationships affected by them are so numerous, that we are all concerned with
such important privacy questions as how such records are made, by
and for whom they are made, how and where they are stored, and,
most particularly, who may have access to them.
Much consideration has been given to problems of protecting patient records against unauthorized access by third parties. This is a
subject, in fact, that has attracted a great deal of interest and generated a considerable body of literature7 With all of this, however,
one aspect of the problem has been relatively neglected; the patient's
own interest in, and right to see and use, the records of his health
history. It is the thesis of this paper that any person who is the subject
of a medical record ought to have an enforceable right to see, examine,
make copies of and otherwise use that record, regardless of who made
it or who may be its custodian. Denial of that right is a significant
abridgement of the ability of the subject of the record to assert and
protect his own rights of privacy.
Before proceeding to the arguments, it will be useful to place the
problem in its proper perspective, by examining briefly how the system of delivering medical care to patients has changed and how these
changes have affected the keeping of medical records.
Not only has the house call become obsolete, but since the 1940's
the omnicompetent general practitioner has come to be replaced by
group and team practice, more and more frequently in an institutional setting. Many factors contributed to this metamorphosis. One,
no doubt, was that an expanding patient load made single practice a
give rise to a right of action in a patient whose records have been improperly opened,
provided the patient is fortunate enough to find out about it. See Munzer v. Blaisdell,
183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
7. The institution of drug abuse programs has produced some interesting literature
on the privacy of those under treatment. E.g., McNamara & Starr, Confidentiality of
Narcotics Addict Treatment Records, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1579 (1973). Privacy problems of computer databanks are thoroughly discussed in A. WESTIN & M. BAKER,
DATABANKS

IN A FREE SoCIETY

360-73 (1972). The specific problems relating to

computer storage and retrieval systems for medical records have produced a thick
volume of papers, prepared by the Joint Task&Group of the Medical Society of the
County of Erie, New York and published by the Journal of Clinical Computing of
Buffalo, New York. JOINT TASK GROUP, MEDICAL PRIVACY AND COMPUTER TEcHNOLOGY

(1974).
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killing burden for the doctor. Perhaps even more significant has been
the information explosion, which has made it impossible for the single
individual to bring to bear on a serious medical problem all the relevant knowledge avalable. The answer to this challenge has, of course,
been the breaking up of medical practice into specialties, and the
specialties in turn into subspecialties, each with its own province, its
own hardware and its own professional preoccupations. Finally, a
third major development has been the fact that large segments of the
population in the low and lower-middle income brackets can now receive good health care, where formerly such people had either inadequate care or none at all. This relatively new body of patients receives
its care mostly at clinics and hospital outpatient departments from
staff specialists.
Along with these changes in the style of health-care delivery, the
keeping of records by the health-care providers has necessarily become
enormously more complicated. Every member of the health-care team
must contribute to the record notes of care given, observations and
recommendations made, results of laboratory tests conducted, and anything else that has gone into the processes of diagnosis and treatment.
The bigger the team, the more necessary it is that the records be kept,
so that each member can have the benefit of what the others have
done and learned. The sheer volume of paper thus generated has given
rise to the kinds of storage and retrieval problems for which independent, computer-operated facilities are now being proposed and designed as an answer.8
Such facilities, of course, develop a technology and a life of their
own apart from the skills and technologies involved either in the delivery of health care or in the maintenance of old-fashioned, file
cabinet record libraries. A whole new body of technicians has thus
been added to the corps of practitioners and their auxiliaries, responsible for keeping track of what happens to a patient. Because of the
sheer number of people who make, read, use, encode, decode, store,
and retrieve the records, the privacy of the records is placed in great
jeopardy, and even more so when the storage facility is separate from
and independent of the plant of the health-care provider. This is because of the extra steps in communication between the makers -and
8. See materials cited note 7 supra.
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users of the records on the one hand and the storage amd retrieval
personnel on the other.
This proliferation of personnel and sophisticated equipment
needed to care for patients has been an important factor-though certainly not the only one-in the skyrocketing of medical costs. It is
commonplace in today's inflated economy that only the rich can personally afford a complicated or extended illness, especially if it requires
hospitalization. In New York City, a stay of two nights in a teaching
hospital for a simple diagnostic procedure can cost as much as $900;
a figure that does not include the fees of the private physicians who
attend the patient.9
Partly because of the increased costs of health care and partly as
a factor in solving the problems of medical and general indigence in
disiributing care to lower-income populations, there have also been
changes in the ways in which health care is paid for. Most serious
medical care is now financed either by insurance companies under
private plans, often with employer participation, or by government
agencies as a form of public assistance.
Application of "spread-the-risk" concepts to the financing of
health care has certainly produced many social benefits, not the least
of which-as has been indicated-is that it has made good care possible for many who would formerly have been unable to afford any
care at all. This benefit, however, is not without its social costs, and
one important item in this column is an accompanying loss of the
protection of the privacy of the records. As banks supervise the affairs
of their large borrowers, and foundations insist on an accounting for
the use of their grants, so too third-party financers of health care
should require accountability of the hospitals that receive the benefit
of, and indeed depend heavily upon, their payments. In short, thirdparty financers, both governmental and private, want and get the privilege of inspecting the health-care records of individual patients.
Hospitals and other providers of health care, even though they
may assert property rights in the records they maintain, 10 do not have
legal. authority to release patient records to third parties. They do
9. This information was supplied to the author by a patient who personally incurred such a bill.
10. For example, the Kaiser Foundation Hospitals Consent Manual declares that
the record is the property of the hospital, and states flatly that the patient has no
right to it. KIMSER FOUNDATION HosPITALs CONSENT MANUAL 90 (1968).
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have an obligation to the patient, sometimes reinforced by statute,"
to maintain the confidentiality of the records unless the patient authorizes their release. This, however, has not proved a serious obstacle
to compliance with the demands of the third-party financers for access
to the records. Along with the other releases and permissions a patient must sign upon entrance to a hospital there is normally included
a waiver allowing the release of records to anyone under contract to
pay the patient's charges. This is potentially a very significant incursion upon the privacy of the patient because it makes the records
freely available to persons, agencies or groups that owe the patient no
duty of confidentiality as to the information they obtain by this means.
Moreover, the patient may not even know the identity of these third
parties, or, if he does, he may find it impossible to uncover the ultimate fate of records in their possession, especially if the third-party
financer is a sizable bureaucracy in its own right.
To a lesser degree, similar problems would arise in connection
with storage of records in an independent databank. Presumably a patient would have to release the records for transfer to a free-standing
storage facility, but once the transfer was made, the records would be
substantially outside the patient's control. The contracts governing
the conditions of storage and retrieval would normally be made between the health-care facility and the databank, with the patient standing in the relation of third-party beneficiary of any provisions that the
direct parties to the contracts had seen fit to include for his benefit.
It does not seem likely that there would be much patient input into
the drafting of such contracts. 12
The risks to patient privacy discussed so far have been only those
relating to records made in the course of the administration of health
care. But, medical records are not only made in a context of diagnosis
and treatment of illness in a health-care facility. They are made for a
great variety of other purposes, many of which are only tangentially
related to the patient's welfare. People are often required, for example, to submit to a physical examination as a condition for receiving
a benefit of some sort: a job, life insurance, the privilege of engaging
11. See, e.g., CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. §§ 52-146(d)-(i) (Supp. 1974); MAINE
ANN. fit. 191, § 2256 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 36
(Supp. 1974); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAv § 15.13 (McKinney Supp. 1974).

REV. STAT.

12. See JOINT TASK GROUP, supra note 7, at 42-43. This is a part of a memorandum from Professor Barry Boyer of the State University of New York at Buffalo
School of Law to the Joint Task Group.
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in school athletics, or a marriage license, to name only a few. An accused person may have to be examined to determine whether he can
stand trial. A convicted person may be examined in connection with
sentencing, or in connection with an application for parole. The law
may require the examination of children who are alleged to have been
neglected or abused, or direct a psychiatric evaluation of parents in a
legal battle over custody. The possibilities are virtually endless.
These health records made outside the context of health care
often have very serious effects upon their subjects' lives. They all have
in common the characteristic that they are usually made for, and kept
by, someone who has no duty at all to maintain their confidentiality.
This is certainly the case with medical records required to be submitted to an actual or prospective employer, or to an insurance company as a prerequisite to getting or keeping insurance. Insurance companies, in fact, have developed a Medical Information Bureau, a
clearing house through which certain medical information furnished
by any insured person or applicant to a member company can be
made available to all. The very existence of such a bureau is antithetical not only to the idea of the confidentiality of the medical
information received, but also to the recognition of any interest on
the part of the subject in the privacy of his records.
It is clear that a wide variety of persons, agencies and organizations may at some time or other, without the subject's knowledge or
consent, have access to or possession of an individual's health records.
Under these circumstances it is almost grotesque that the subject himself, the person most intimately concerned and most directly affected,
is routinely not permitted to see them. Most people, in fact, take this
for granted although questions are now being raised as to the propriety of this state of affairs.
It is tempting to speculate upon how it came about that health
records are customarily withheld from the subjects themselves. It may
be because, from the earliest days, the practice of medicine has always
had a powerful mystique. Medicine men were magicians, and the very
essence of magic is that the onlooker does not know how it was done. 13
Whether the effect produced is the cure of a disease or the materializa13. Compare the myth of Ceres healing the sick child in the course of her
search for Proserpine. When the process was interrupted by the child's mortal parents,
Ceres reproached them for foiling her efforts to make the child immortal. T. BULFINCH, MYTHOLOGY 53 (abr. E. Fullen 1959).
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tion of a flock of pigeons out of an empty silk hat, the performer is
expected to keep his audience bemused. And even in this day of scientific medicine, an important element of therapy is the faith of the
patient in the healer. It is perhaps not surprising, in a culture that
produced the Book of Job, that one who holds the power of life and
death over others may demand from his worshippers (read patients)
a certain amount of blind faith. Even apart from the element of
superstition or faith, medicine is usually practiced upon people who,
because of their illness, are in a genuinely dependent position or who
need or want something that a doctor can help them to get or prevent
them from getting. It may be that consciousness of this very real
power in the medical profession, combined with its traditional fierce
sense of autonomy, have been strong contributing factors perpetuating
the practice of excluding patients from seeing their own records-a
practice maintained not only by the doctors themselves but by all
their surrogates in the administration of health care.
Apart from these speculations, however, when reasons are given
for prohibiting patients or other subjects from seeing their own health
records, those reasons purport to derive from the doctor-patient relationship. The assumption is that the doctor is the one who should
control what information is given to the patient, for the patient's own
good.
In justification of withholding the records from the patient it is
frequently asserted, for example, that the records are in technical
language which the patient will not understand. Since he does not
understand the records, the argument proceeds, the patient will misinterpret them and possibly even indulge in self-medication and other
hazardous pursuits. To protect them from themselves, patients must,
therefore, be given information as they are given dangerous drugs: by
doctor's prescription only, in measured doses. 14
This argument is at odds with the proposition, accepted in law
and at least nominally in practice, that no treatment should be given
to a patient unless he has given informed consent to the procedure.
Informed consent, if it means anything at all, means that the proposed
procedure is explained to the patient beforehand in comprehensible
terms. This places a clear duty upon whoever is responsible for treat14. See Entnacher, Computerized Insurance Records, in 3 HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT 8

(1973).
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ment to see that the patient does understand enough to give an intelligent consent. It seems reasonable that permitting a patient who
wishes to do so to see his chart might help rather than hinder the
process of obtaining informed consent.
Moreover, the fact that the record is difficult to understand hardly
seems adequate ground to censor the patient's reading. Leaving aside
the possibility that the makers of the records might take pains to write
them more intelligibly, it is probable that the patient who cannot
understand them will give it up anyway, or else will ask some knowledgeable person to explain them. The status of being a patient does
not warrant being treated as an incompetent. In any event, there is no
suggestion here that the records should be thrust upon a patient who
prefers to rely upon the doctor for information.
The other principal ground for keeping patients from seeing
their own records is that, for one reason or another, there may be
material in the record that would harm the patient were he to see it.
The kinds of information which the proponents of this argument
commonly use as illustrations are fatal prognoses or diagnoses of malignant disease, which many think it preferable to withhold from the
patient. But the question here dealt with is whether the records
should be accessible to patients who wish to see them; again, it is not
proposed that the records be thrust upon those who do not. It is assumed that the patient is competent, and not too young to exercise
judgment; if such a patient asks to see the record, presumably he has
considered the possibility that it may contain distressing information.
In any case, persons sui juris are supposed to have the privilege
and the responsibility of making their own decisions and coping with
their own errors. This is a basic assumption underlying the law of
contract and tort, not to mention the rule requiring informed consent.
To prevent a patient from obtaining important information concerning himself is to deprive him of the means of making important decisions in his life; choices that he might have made much more providently had the information not been denied to him. The impact of
these choices falls not on the custodians of the information but on the
subject himself and on the people to whom he relates in his ordinary
life.
Furthermore, even if there is merit to the position that patients
should be shielded from direct exposure to certain kinds of informa-
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tion included in their records, it does not follow from this that all
records should be withheld from all patients. What of the patient who
has been treated for a self-limited disease, a broken leg, a tonsillectomy, an appendectomy, or has simply had an early delivery? And
what of the patient who already knows the fatal prognosis? For these
patients, 15and many others, the argument in terrorem is simply inap-

plicable.

It would be well to note that psychiatrists sometimes advance an
additional point in defense of keeping the record from their patients.
For purposes of psychotherapy, these practitioners sometimes make
use of statements made to them by third persons about the patient.
Understandably, they do not wish to violate the confidences of the third
persons by revealing them to the patient. But, in cases of this sort,
other interests than those of the patient are present and require protection. The outside informers may have privacy interests of their own
in the information that they have entrusted to the psychiatrist, and
the psychiatrist may owe them a moral duty not to breach this trust
by disclosing it against their wishes. The patient's right to see his own
records may thus be limited by someone else's equivalent right not to
have certain material disclosed. Admittedly, the problem is a delicate
one, but is better solved by creating an exception to a general rule
permitting access (if the exception could be very carefully drafted),
than by creating a general rule denying access. 10
There are, on the other hand, sound reasons for giving patients
access to their own records upon request, whatever they contain.
Assuming the worst, a patient with a short or a dubious life expectancy may have many arrangements to make for the disposition of his
or her affairs. There may be a will to make or revise, there may be a
need to designate guardians for young children and make provisions
for other dependents, or there may be business affairs to conclude.
In less drastic cases it may be useful, or perhaps necessary, for a patient to know what drugs he has been given. Drugs sometimes have
undesirable or unexpected side effects. A patient should be in a position to refuse a drug that has produced an allergic response in him on
a previous occasion; he cannot do so unless he knows both what he
15. See Gutman, The Right to Know, in 3

HAsTINos CENTER REPORT 9 (1973).
16. These problems are considered in an article by Robert M. Veatch, Medical
Records: Patient Rights and Responsibilities, a publication of the Hastings Institute
of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, Hastings, New York.
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was given on the previous occasion and what he is being offered now.
He should also be prepared to understand that some of the symptoms
he is feeling may be the result of the medication that has been prescribed for him, rather than the indicia of a new and frightening
disease. A dramatic example of this is the recent discovery that diethyl
stilbestrol, given to many pregnant women in the years between 1948
and 1965 to prevent spontaneous abortion, may be the cause of malignant disease in the daughters of these women. It is a grave disservice to the mother of a girl born during that period to deny her
access to the records that would conclusively show whether that drug
was given to her while she was pregnant with the child. Less dramatic,
but nevertheless important, is the consideration that in a mobile society permitting a patient to have copies of his medical records will
give him some assurance of continuity of care no matter where he may
17
move.
An obvious practical reason for permitting patients to see their
own records is to give them an opportunity to make sure the records
are correct. Even with the best intent in the world, errors still occur.
Patients with like names are confused with one another, a house officer makes an improper entry, papers are shuffled or lost; the larger
the bureaucracy where the records are maintained, the greater the
risk. It is the patient and not the medical staff or the records custodian that will suffer the consequences of these mistakes; therefore,
it is the patient who should have the opportunity to question the
contents of the chart.
Finally, whatever right a subject may have to the privacy of his
medical records is seriously prejudiced unless he can have access to
them. If we acknowledge the basic premise of the law that the person
with standing to assert a right is the possessor of the right-the premise implicit in the constitutional requirement of a "case or controversy" for federal jurisdiction-there is an inherent absurdity in placing the onus of protecting a right of privacy upon the one person most
consistently deprived of access to, and information about, the materials as to which the right is asserted. Lawsuits are not brought to
claim abstract interests in theoretical justice but to redress real wrongs
that cause actual injury to real people. If a person's privacy rights are
to have any value where medical records are concerned, it is essential
17. See id.
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that he have the legal right to know what is in the records, as well as
where they are, where they have gone, and who has access to them.
It must not be forgotten that the persons who exercise the power
to withhold access to the records cannot be assumed to be totally
neutral, much less to be acting in the interest of the patient at all
times. A doctor and a hospital with custody of the records may have
substantial interests of their own, adverse to those of the patient, that
would motivate them to conceal the contents of the records. For
example, if the providers of health care are protecting themselves
against a malpractice action, they cannot be expected to protect the
interests of a patient who may be contemplating such an action. It is
no answer to say that the patient can authorize the release of the
records to an attorney. The patient may wish and should be able to
make a preliminary decision for himself before engaging counsel.
The arguments are even more persuasive for allowing the subject
to have access to the records when the custodian is not a provider of
health care. Such custodians have no duty of confidentiality to the
persons whose records they hold,' 8 although they may purport to derive their privilege of withholding the records from the asserted power
and responsibility of the doctor. 19 Moreover, they often have their
own affirmative reasons to disregard the privacy interests of the subjects; such as the forming or joining of an information pool like the
Medical Information Bureau, mentioned above. The very reasons that
these custodians assert for obtaining the medical records are in derogation of the privacy rights of the subjects, who have sacrificed those
rights in order to obtain benefits or comply with necessary conditions.
Therefore, if the subject has no access to the records, he is placed
wholly at the mercy of the custodian, who, in turn, is indifferent to
the rights the subject is seeking to protect.
The idea of giving people access to their own health records is
startling to some, but in fact it has been tried in a few places in connection with administration of health care, evidently without calamity.
Richard E. Bouchard and his associates at the University of Vermont
have reported favorably on the results of a program of giving patients
an active role in the preparation of the records as well as full information as to their contents.&2 0 After a similar experiment at Yale, Budd
18. See Milano v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 290, 253 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
19. See Entmacher, supra note 14.
20. R. Bouchard, The Patient and his Problem-Oriented Record (undated).

RIGHTS OF ACCESS

N. Shenkin and David C. Warner have advocated full access and disclosure of the records to patients. 21 The State of Massachusetts has a
statute that gives patients, except mental patients, the right to see
their own records. 22 Lastly, efforts were made to include a patient
right of access in a proposed New York City privacy ordinance, which,
unfortunately, was defeated by powerful organized opposition.
At present, most of the law regulating control of medical records
-apart from statutes conferring one or another form of confidential
status and such exceptional enactments as that of Massachusetts-has
been made piecemeal, based upon the exercise of the power derived
from physical possession, the proverbial nine-tenths of the law. It is
not likely that this power *ill be voluntarily surrendered. Organization, money, and other attributes of political strength are on the side
of the custodians of the records, whoever they happen to be. Patients,
on the other hand, are a mixed lot, normally acting as individuals,
possessing very little in common and having no effective means of
communicating with one another. Accordingly, if patients are to
achieve access to their records and receive other help in asserting privacy rights with respect to them, it will have to be done by legislation. 23
In the interest of effectiveness and uniformity, this legislation
ought to be generally applicable, in the manner of the Administrative
25
Procedure Act 24 and its successor, the Freedom of Information Act.
At the least, it should include: (1) an enforceable right in a subject
to see and copy his own records in the hands of any custodian; (2)
a reasonable opportunity to point out errors and have them either
explained or corrected; (3) reasonable notice of the identity of the
person or organization to whom the information will be given, of
the purpose for which it is to be given, and the circumstances under
which the transfer will be made, if the information is to be placed
in the possession of anyone other than the original custodian; (4)
a duty of confidentiality toward the patient that will restrict the power
of any holder of health records to publish or share them except as
prescribed; and (5) a duty on the part of any custodian of health
21.
J.

MED.,

22.
23.
24.
25.
L. Rnv.

Shenkin & Warner, Giving the Patient His Medical Record, NEw ENGLAND
Sept. 27, 1973, at 688.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 36 (Supp. 1974).
See materials cited note 2 supra & accompanying text.
5 U.S.C. § 551-59 (1970).
Id. § 552 (1967); see Waples, The Freedom of Information Act, 74 COLUM.
895 n.1, 896 n.2 (1974).
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records to notify the subject of the records whenever it receives a
subpoena to produce those records, so that the subject may have an
opportunity, consistent with usual due process criteria, to contest the
subpoena.
We are witnessing a steady shrinkage of the area within which
we can be free of interference from outsiders, even as regards our
most intimate affairs. And yet, as technology improves it is more and
more important that we be vigilant in protecting whatever is left of
our privacy. The enactment of a statute such as the one here advocated might prove to be a rear-guard action, but it would nevertheless have significant value as an assertion of a continuing, indestructible concern in society for the unique worth of the individual.

